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1. Introduction 
 
The literature on R&D organization discusses the choice between cooperative and non-
cooperative R&D. For instance, d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) and Suzumura 
(1992) discuss the choice under R&D spillovers, Marjit (1991) under uncertain R&D 
outcomes, and Silipo and Weiss (2005) under both Spillovers and uncertainty. Combs 
(1992) extends the analysis to the case of  multiple research projects, Kabiraj (2007) 
introduces synergy in R&D cooperation, Mukherjee and Marjit (2004) introduce 
technology transfer with the choice of R&D organization, and Choi (1992, 1993) 
introduces moral hazard. Then Kabiraj (2006) studies the effect of imitation and patent 
protection, and Mukherjee and Ray (2009) introduce uncertainty in patent approvals. 
Finally, Kabiraj and Mukherjee (2000) discuss the choice between cooperative and 
independent research in a three-firm framework and Motta (1992) discusses the choice 
when products are vertically differentiated. 
 
None of the above works, however, discusses the problem of choice of R&D organization 
under incomplete information. Hence the purpose of the present paper is to extend the 
literature to the case of incomplete information about the types of competing firms. 
Consider process innovation which reduces the unit cost of production by an amount 
0>ε  which is a random variable and is realized before the product market competition 
begins. Under cooperative research the firms have symmetric access to information hence 
the firms know exactly the size of the innovation at the stage of final goods production. 
But under non-cooperative R&D, we assume that the R&D outcome is private 
information. Each firm knows the realization of its R&D outcome, but its rival firm 
knows only the prior distribution of the size of the innovation. Hence under non-
cooperative R&D, at the stage of ex post competition in the product market, each firm 
knows its own unit cost of production, but it does not know its contender’s unit cost with 
certainty. 
 
Then the question arises: what will be the choice of R&D organization under this 
situation? The lone paper that discusses the problem under incomplete information is by 
Kabiraj and Chattopadhyay (2014), but this paper assumes only two possible research 
outcomes (like success and failure) and that the firms compete in quantities a la Cournot 
in the product market. The present paper, therefore, considers the scenario involving a 
continuum of research outcomes. Thus we assume that the size of the innovation is 
continuously distributed over a given interval. In particular, we assume that the size of 
the innovation is continuous with a given mean and a constant variance. Then the 
question is: how is the choice between cooperative and non-cooperative R&D affected by 
these parameters? Does a larger variance increase or decrease incentives for cooperative 
research? We also like to examine in this context whether the nature of product market 
competition has any significant effect on the choice of R&D organization. Hence we 
consider both quantity as well as price competition in the product market. 
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We assume research joint venture as the form of R&D cooperation, thus under RJV the 
firms will share both R&D costs and outcomes. Therefore the firms are to decide ex ante 
whether they will share research outcomes and expenses or conduct R&D independently. 
They will cooperate in research if and only if ex ante the expected payoff from 
cooperation is strictly larger. We discuss the problem in a duopoly set up under each of 
quantity and price competition. We show that the larger is the variance of the size of the 
innovation, the smaller will be the incentive for cooperative research. Thus our analysis 
highlights the role of variance of R&D outcomes in the choice of R&D organization. 
However, our analysis shows that the nature of product market competition does not play 
any significant role in the choice of R&D organization.   
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and results and section 3 
concludes the paper. 
 
2. Model 
 
Consider the interaction of two firms both in R&D and production. We call them firm 1 
and firm 2. While R&D interaction can be either cooperative or non-cooperative, product 
market interaction is always non-cooperative. In the product market they play either 
Cournot game or Bertrand game. And under cooperative research the firms share both 
R&D cost and outcomes equally, hence cooperative research takes the form of RJV. On 
the other hand, under non-cooperative research each firm invests in its own lab. In any 
case, the R&D outcome is stochastic. Given an initial unit cost of 0>c  for each firm, if 
an amount 0>R  is invested in R&D, it reduces unit cost of production to ε−c . Hence, 
0>ε  represents the size of the innovation. We restrict ourselves to the assumption that 
the innovation is non-drastic or minor in the sense that even if only one firm succeeds in 
the innovation effort, it still cannot emerge as a monopolist. Hence product market 
competition is always a duopoly in our model. Assume that ε  is continuously distributed 
over a given interval with a given density and distribution function. In particular, we 
assume that the distribution has a given mean and a constant variance.  
 
When the firms work together to conduct the research, both can equally observe the 
outcome and hence, under RJV, both the firms are symmetrically informed about the 
extent of cost reduction due to R&D. However, when the firms conduct research non-
cooperatively, only the respective firms observe the R&D outcomes perfectly. Thus no 
firm can ex ante be sure about the level of unit cost of its contender and hence there is 
asymmetry of information about the R&D outcome. Here each firm can have a multitude 
of types based on the volume of reduction in its unit cost following its R&D. Each firm 
has only a prior probabilistic notion about the type of its contender. The probability 
distribution and the interval on which the types are distributed are common knowledge. 
So this is a sequential move game where, when the stage of product market competition 
is reached, under non-cooperative research the firms choose their strategies (quantity or 
price as the case may be) based on their expectations about their rivals’ types. We assume 
both the firms to be risk-neutral. Thus, under non-cooperative R&D organization, we 
have a Bayesian game where the firms maximize their expected payoffs and have to 
make a decision ex ante about conducting the R&D cooperatively or non-cooperatively. 
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We consider the following two-stage game. In the first stage the firms decide whether 
they will cooperate or non-cooperate in R&D based on their estimated expected payoff.  
Then at the production stage they play a quantity (Cournot) or price (Bertrand) game. If it 
is non-cooperative R&D in the first stage, then they play the Bayesian Nash game in the 
second stage, and if it is cooperative R&D in the first stage, it is simple Nash game in the 
second stage. In the following subsection we consider quantity competition in the product 
market with a homogeneous good, and in the next subsection we consider price 
competition with differentiated products.  
 
2.1 Quantity Competition 
 
Assume that under quantity competition, the firms produce a perfectly substitute good. 
And the market demand for the product in inverted form is given by  
 
c  };  ,0 max{ 21 >−−= aqqap                                                                         (1) 
 
where p  is the price of the product and iq  is the supply of firm i . We now estimate the 
expected payoffs of the firms from each of cooperative and non-cooperative R&D. 
 
Consider first non-cooperative research at the R&D stage. Each firm invests R  in its own 
research lab and comes up with a cost reduction by an amount ε  which is a random and 
independent draw from the given interval with mean ε  and constant variance 2εσ , or 
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Hence ex ante the expected payoff of firm i  is, 
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Now consider RJV in the R&D stage. Under cooperative research if the RJV comes up 
with the marginal cost c~ , each firm’s payoff in the product market is 
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Now, comparing (2) and (3), NCC Π>Π  if and only if 
 
2 
36
5
)2/( εσ>R                                                                                                     (4) 
 
We have the following result. 
 
Proposition 1: The larger the variance of the size of the innovation the smaller is the 
incentive for cooperative research. 
 
Thus our paper draws attention to the importance of variance of the size of the innovation 
or R&D outcome in the choice of R&D organization. Larger 2εσ  raises the possibility 
that under non-cooperative case one firm comes up with a large innovation while the 
other with a small innovation. Then if R&D cost is not large enough, the firms will go for 
non-cooperative research.  
 
2.2 Price Competition 
 
In this subsection we consider price competition at the production stage. Consider that the 
firms produce differentiated products. Let the demand as faced by firm i  be given by, 
 
jii ppbq θβ +−= ;   0 ;0 >>> θβb                                                              (5) 
 
First assume that the firms play a non-cooperative game in the R&D stage. Under 
incomplete information let 
e
jp  be the expected price to be charged by firm j  as 
perceived by firm i . Then firm i ’s problem is:  
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Therefore, ex ante the expected payoff from non-cooperative R&D is 
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Under cooperative research, for any cˆ , the equilibrium price is 
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This gives the ex ante expected payoff of each firm under cooperative research to be 
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Hence NCC Π>Π ˆˆ  if and only if, 
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Structurally, this is very similar to the inequality (4). Hence price competition under both 
complete and incomplete information leads to similar results as obtained under quantity 
competition. Therefore, the nature of the product market competition does not play any 
significant role in the choice of R&D organization. 
 
 
3. Conclusion 
 
In the presence of high R&D costs and threat of imitation and leaking out of knowledge, 
cooperative R&D is generally encouraged and considered to be a way out. In this paper 
we have considered the scenario when the R&D outcome is stochastic and continuous 
and at the stage of product market competition firms have asymmetric information about 
the rivals’ cost structure. Hence the paper discusses the choice of R&D organization 
under incomplete information. We have considered both price competition and quantity 
competition in the product market and assumed that the size of the innovation is 
continuously distributed with a given mean and a constant variance. We have shown that 
as the variance goes up, incentives for cooperative research falls, and this does not 
depend on the nature of the product market competition.  
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